Israeli Government Legitimizes the Far Right Through Antisemitism Conference
On January 26 and 27, 2026, an international conference on combating antisemitism took place in Jerusalem. The event, organized under the auspices of the Israeli government, coincided with International Holocaust Remembrance Day. Governments, diplomats, and academics were in attendance, as expected. Less expected was who else had a seat at the table.
Among the participants were politicians from European and international far-right parties. Figures typically known for their roles in debates on migration, nationalism, and identity politics were now present at an official diplomatic forum. They joined panels, spoke with government representatives, and appeared alongside ministers and heads of state.
Attendees included Dutch politician Geert Wilders (PVV), who spoke via video, Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the Sweden Democrats, Sam Van Rooy from Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, and Brazilian Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro. These are politicians widely known in their home countries for their hardline stances on migration, nationalism, and culture wars and frequently linked to radical-right or authoritarian rhetoric.
Formally, the conference focused on fighting antisemitism. In practice, the discussions extended further. Migration, Islamic extremism, and national security featured prominently. This combination is precisely what made the event politically significant and controversial.
The presence of far-right politicians was no coincidence and had three clear consequences:
First, the far right is being normalized in diplomatic contexts. By inviting such figures to an official conference on a morally urgent topic, they are gradually removed from the status of political fringe. Their presence acts as institutional recognition and extends beyond electoral campaigns.
Second, the fight against antisemitism becomes intertwined with broader cultural and security agendas. Topics like migration, Islam, and the “protection of Western values” are placed on the same level as the struggle against hatred toward Jewish communities. This allows far-right parties to present their usual narratives as part of a legitimate solution, no longer merely as protest or provocation.
Third, the far right enters a new phase of institutional legitimacy on the global stage. These leaders are no longer merely confronted or questioned, they are now treated as interlocutors by established international actors. This visibility reinforces their status as serious players in global political discourse.
Politics is not just about positions, but about who gets to speak, and where. Participation in a state-level conference grants prestige, regardless of what is said. Even without explicit endorsement, the boundaries of the acceptable shift.
For governments, this fusion of moral and security agendas may be strategically useful. Policies centered on control, restriction, and conflict are framed as ethical imperatives. For the far right, the benefits are even more obvious: taking part in a conference on antisemitism grants moral credibility and softens past controversies.
The conference in Jerusalem was therefore more than a debate about antisemitism. It showed how the far right increasingly gains access to international platforms through themes that carry moral weight and are difficult to challenge publicly. That quiet, institutional shift is exactly what makes this development so significant.